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Amicus Curiae ChevronTexaco Exploration and Production Company 
("ChevronTexaco")1 hereby submits this brief in support of the appeal of ExxonMobil 
Corporation. The filing of this brief is contingent on the Court granting ChevronTexacofs 
motion for leave to file brief of an amicus curiae in accordance with Rule 25, Utah R. 
App. P. 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
This case involves an appeal by ExxonMobil Corporation from the decision of the 
Utah State Tax Commission ("Tax Commission") in ExxonMobil Corporation v. Auditing 
Division of the Utah State Tax Commission, Case No. 00-0901. In that decision, the Tax 
Commission ruled that ExxonMobil's oil should be valued at the "point of sale" for 
severance tax purposes, whether the sale occurs at the well or downstream from the well. 
Record ("R.") at 13. ExxonMobil argues on appeal that its oil should be valued "at the 
well," in accordance with Utah Code § 59-5-102(l)(a) (2002), which requires oil and gas 
producers to pay to the State of Utah a severance tax "equal to 4% of the value, at the 
well, of the oil or gas produced." (Emphasis added.) The positions of ExxonMobil and 
the Tax Commission are summarized in the following diagram: 
1
 ChevronTexaco Exploration and Production Company was preceded in interest 
in the issues relevant to this case by Texaco Exploration and Production Company. For 
ease of reference, this brief will refer to the company through all periods as 
"ChevronTexaco." 
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Wells 
Separator and Compressor in Gas Field; 
Satellite and Battery in Oil Field 
Gathering Lines 
ExxonMobil Position: 
Always Value Oil 
or Gas at the Well 
In the Tax Commission's ExxonMobil decision, two of the four Commissioners 
agreed with ExxonMobil and ruled that oil and gas should be valued at the well. R. at 
34-39, 296-98. The other two Commissioners, in separate opinions, ruled that oil and gas 
should be valued at the "point of sale" (these latter two separate opinions will be referred 
to hereinafter as the "Point of Sale Opinions"). R. at 34-39, 288-94. All four 
Commissioners then ruled, based on Tax Commission Rule R861-1A-21, that the 
taxpayer loses when there is a two-two Tax Commission vote. R. at 36-39. ExxonMobil 
accordingly lost its case before the Tax Commission and has appealed to this Court. 
Like ExxonMobil, ChevronTexaco urges this Court to reverse the Commission 
decision. ChevronTexaco has reviewed the amicus brief filed by ConocoPhillips 
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Company, and requests the Court to reverse tl le "I 'ax COIIII i lission decision for the reasons 
set forth therein, i 'licvn>n i IINJCU ,I!MI rontends that the Tax Commission decision should 
IN; iI:\III\SCI1 lm (In- following additional reasons. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Point of Sale Opinions Ignore I lie Plain Language of the Utah Code. 
The r suggest it is "reasonable and permissible" to read the 
I itait ( o(lr »is requiring oil and gas to be valued at the point of sal* 
position is in error, as the Utah Code clearly provides i * t^ be valued "at 
the well." The statutes in issue, with nnpkiMs Jtldni, provide as follows: 
Oil and gas producers "shall pay to the state a severance tax equal to 4% of 
the value, at the well, of the oil or gas produced." 
Utah Code t * >.* 
'"Value at the well1 means the value i > I « < / iint production is 
completed" 
Utah Code §59-5-101(19). 
"Well or wells1 means any extractive means from which oil or gas is 
produced or extracted, located within art oil and gas field, and operated by 
one person." 
Utah Code §59-5-101(20). 
,f[T]he value of oil or gas at the well is the value established under an arm's 
length contract for the purchase of production at the well, or in the absence 
2
 Whereas the statutes relevant to this appeal have been unchanged during the 
period relevant to the appeal, all cites to the I Jtah Code herein are to the 2002 version for 
ease of reference. 
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of such a contract, by the value established in accordance with the first 
applicable of the following methods: 
(a) the value at the well established under a non-armfs»length contract 
for the purchase of production at the well, provided that the value is 
equivalent to the value received under comparable arm's-length contracts for 
purchases or sales of like-quality oil or gas in the same field; 
(b) the value at the well determined by consideration of information 
relevant in valuing like-quality oil or gas at the well in the same field or nearby 
fields or areas such as: posted prices, prices received in arm's-length spot sales, or 
other reliable public sources of price or market information; 
(c) the value established using the net-back method as defined in Section 
59-5-101." 
Utah Code §59-5-103(1). 
"
fNet-back method1 means a method of calculating the fair market value of 
oil or gas at the well. Under this method, costs of transportation ... and 
processing shall be deducted from any proceeds received for the oil and gas . 
it 
Utah Code §59-5-101(7). 
"Transportation costs1 means the reasonable actual costs of transporting oil 
or gas products from the well to the point of sale . . . . " 
Utah Code §59-5-101(17). 
Based on these statutes, this case turns on where "the well" is, or in other words, 
"the point production is completed." Several different authorities indicate that "the well" 
means the well, prior to gathering, as advocated by ExxonMobil (see diagram above), and 
not the point of sale, as advocated by the Tax Commission. 
First, the Utah Code itself defines the term "well" to mean "any extractive means 
from which oil or gas is produced or extracted'' Utah Code § 59-5-101(20) (emphasis 
added). In turn, Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1981) defines "extract" 
as follows: "to pull out (as something embedded or otherwise firmly affixed)" and also 
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"to separate (an ore or mineral) from a tlcposi! " i hnphasis added.) Similarly, the 
Concise Oxford Dictionary (I V*>,?) defines "extract" to mean "to / emove or take out, 
especially In ' H'iort or force (anything firmly rooted)" and to "obtain (a tiatuutl ie\otti" i ) 
from the earth." (Emphasis added.) In addition, VVilium , ,*( fvl, / rs, Oil and Gas Law, 
Volume 8, Chapter A ' '<»«»] I cidines ' •> ai,i i ilir well'" to mean "that the oil and gas is to 
be valued in ils unprocessed state as it comes to the surface at the mouth of the well." 
(Emphasis added.) In the case of oil and gas, it is "pulled out" of the grcunl. "\t iff ttrd" 
from the deposit, "removed," "taken out," "obtainet id brought "to the 
surface" at the well prior to giitluTiiiy (MY diagram above), not at the point of sale after 
gathering >wing through gathering lines is not being extracted. 
Accordingly, the gathering lines cannot be part of the "well," and the " v alue at tl le w ell" 
must be ascertained prior to gathering. 
Second, the term., "prodm-hun lias been defined to be completed at the well by 
scrotal si .uh r, i\i, ,\i importantly, under the Utah Code, the "point production is 
complete" is a definition of "value at the weir under Utah Code £ >9-:,: I u 11 I •>) 
(emphasis added). The fact that the term ""|"iiMhit. \v m i •, defining the term "well," is a 
strong indicator i >mpleted at the well. 
F* loivnvei, the definition section of the severance tax statutes defines f\ rudr oil1' as 
hydrocarbons "produced and recovered at the wellheaa od< * 
59-5-101(8)(a) (emphasis added). Ii also • Hinr,' "\vi II" \\\ ".in\ extractive means from 
which oil or gas is /tmi/mvd or extracted " Utah Code § 59-5-101(20) (emphasis 
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added). If hydrocarbons are already "produced11 (in the past tense) at the well/wellhead, 
then production is necessarily complete at that point. 
As further support that production is complete at the well, Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary (1981) defines "production" as "bringing out." Oil and gas are 
"brought out" when they are extracted from the ground and brought to the surface at the 
well. After this extraction has occurred, the oil and gas are simply transported through 
gathering lines. No more "producing" takes place. Gathering, transporting, refining, 
distributing, and retailing all follow production, as production only occurs once. 
Accordingly, production is completed prior to gathering and the value at the well should 
be ascertained at that point. 
The only known state severance tax case that has looked at the issue of production 
ruled in ExxonMobil's favor. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. State, 918 P.2d 980, 984 (Wyo. 
1996) ("processes necessary for production of gas, for severance and ad valorem tax 
purposes, are those necessary to sever or remove the gas from the well" and any processes 
"not necessary to remove the gas from the well are post-production expenses"). 
Cases interpreting the Natural Gas Act also support ExxonMobil's position on 
production. See e.g.. Continental Oil Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 266 F.2d 208, 211 
(5th Cir. 1959), cert, denied, 361 U.S. 827 (1959) ("in the ordinary sense of the terms 
[sic] production of the gas has been completed at or just above the surface of the ground") 
(emphasis added); Saturn Oil & Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n. 250 F.2d 61, 64 
(10th Cir. 1958), cert, denied, 355 U.S. 956 (1958) ("Production of gas is the act of 
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bringing forth gas from the earth. Gathering of gas is the act of collecting gas after it has 
been brought forth from the earth."). 
Federal income tax cases are also supportive. See e.g.. Mountain Fuel Supply Co. 
v. United States, 449 F.2d 816, 823 (10th Cir. 1971), cert, denied, 405 U.S. 989 (1972) 
(where the depletable base of taxpayers includes only facilities used in "production," 
holding that a separator in a natural gas field downstream from the well was not part of 
the depletable base, because the separator was "not part of production nor necessary 
thereto"); Shamrock Oil & Gas Co. v. Comm'n. 346 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1965), cert, 
denied, 382 U.S. 892 (1965) (holding that absorption and fractionation processes were not 
a part of taxpayer's depletable base because they were in "no sense essential to 
production"). 
Oil and gas lease cases and treatises are similarly supportive. See e.g. Harvey E. 
Yates Co. v. Powell. 98 F.3d 1222,1230-31 (10th Cir. 1996) ("Traduction* has an 
established legal meaning when used in a royalty or habendum clause of an oil and gas 
lease. 'Production1 requires severance of the mineral from the ground") (citing State v. 
Pennzoil Co., 752 P.2d 975, 979 (Wyo. 1988)); Pinev Woods Country Life Sch. v. Shell 
Oil Co.. 726 F.2d 225, 240 (5th Cir. 1984) ("production ends when gas is severed from 
the earth"); Martin v. Glass. 571 F. Supp. 1406, 1411 (N.D. Tex. 1983) ("the royalty was 
based on the value of the gas at the point of production (at the mouth of the well)"); 
Creson v. Amoco Prod. Co.. 10 P.3d 853, 858 (N.M. App. 2000) ("production costs" are 
"expenses incurred in exploring for mineral substances and in bringing them to the 
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surface") (quoting Parker v. TO Prod. Corp.. 716 S.W.2d 644, 648 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986)); 
Merritt v. Southwestern Electric Power Co.. 499 So.2d 210, 213 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (the 
wellhead is "the point of production"); Williams & Myers, Oil and Gas Law, Volume 3, 
Chapter 6, § 645.2 ("expenses of compressing gas to make it deliverable into a 
purchaser's pipeline" are costs "subsequent to production"). 
Third, the tax at issue is a severance tax, which is defined as a tax imposed on 
petroleum and mineral production "at the time they are removed or severed from the 
soil." Black's Law Dictionary, p. 1374 (6th Ed. 1990); see also Williams and Myers, Oil 
and Gas Law. Volume 8, Chapter S (defining severance tax as "a tax on the removal of 
minerals from the ground"). Gas is severed from the ground at the well, not downstream. 
Based on these authorities and the plain language of the Utah Code, production is 
complete at the well, which is the point where oil or gas is severed from the earth. 
Accordingly, the Point of Sale Opinions of the Tax Commission, which rule that 
production is complete at the point of sale, even if that is downstream from the well, 
should be reversed by this Court. 
II. The Point of Sale Opinions Lack Authority, Logic, and Fairness. 
In addition to ignoring the plain language of the Utah Code, the Point of Sale 
Opinions have crafted a "point of sale" theory that is without authority, logic, or fairness. 
First, the Point of Sale Opinions cite to no authority to support their claimed 
standard that "production is complete" where the oil or gas is sold. R. at 288-94. 
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Second, the Point of Sale Opinions create an illogical severance tax scheme. 
While "severance tax" is a "usually regarded as a form of property taxation" (Black's Law 
Dictionary, p. 1374 (6th Ed. 1990)), the Point of Sale Opinions convert the severance tax 
into a sales tax by imposing the tax wherever the point of sale is. This cannot be correct 
under the statutes because the severance tax is imposed on oil or gas that is not sold, but 
that is "shipped outside the state," or "stockpiled" for two years. Utah Code § 
59-5-102(l)(e) and (f). Moreover, under the "net-back method," the Legislature allows a 
deduction for "the reasonable actual costs of transporting oil or gas products from the 
well to the point of sale" Id. § 59-5-101(17) (emphasis added). If the severance tax were 
imposed at the point of sale, there could never be any transportation deduction, nor any 
net-back method. This theory is thus illogical and must be rejected. 
Third, the Point of Sale Opinions are unfair because they tax two taxpayers on 
different values for the same oil or gas. This violates the Utah Constitution which 
requires that "all laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation." Utah Const. Art. 
1, § 24. The Point of Sale Opinions would tax one taxpayer at $8/barrel at the well if that 
is the point of sale, and another at $12/barrel downstream if that is the point of sale.3 In 
this scenario, the extra $4/barrel is not a tax on oil or gas, it is a tax on the capital 
improvements downstream from the well. This is not only unfair, it violates Utah Code 
section 59-5-102(l)(a), which provides that the severance tax is imposed on "oil and gas," 
not capital improvements. 
3
 Oil can be and is sold both at the well and downstream (R. at 283-84). 
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Lastly, the point of sale analysis raises the issue of whether oil and gas extracted in 
Utah, but sold out of state, is taxable in Utah at all. It certainly was not the intent of our 
Legislature to allow oil or gas produced in Utah to go untaxed. 
For all these reasons, the point of sale theory espoused in the Point of Sale 
Opinions should be rejected by this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, the Supreme Court should reverse the decision of 
the Tax Commission by holding that: (1) the Point of Sale Opinions are in error; and (2) 
oil and gas in Utah must be valued at the well, or in other words, at the point it is 
extracted and brought to the surface of the earth, prior to entering the gathering lines. 
DATED this 12th day of March, 2003. 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLP 
W\dl 6UAA ' 
Mark K. Buchi 
Steven P. Young 
Attorneys for ChevronTexaco Exploration and 
Production Company 
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